The document entitled In Defence of Feyerabend is dated June 16th, but was only published on Nutters.org a matter of hours prior to the publication of this log entry. This discrepancy is explained by the fact that I submitted it as a part of my course requirements for PHIL232, Philosophy of Science, on the earlier date, but only received it back today. Having had it assessed, I've decided to publish it without further modification, but I'll here take the opportunity to address the points my lecturer raised in marking it, since they deserve a response. I'll address them in what I see as more-or-less order of increasing importance.

One query raised by my lecturer was as to why I thought science would exhibit "cycles of fashion" rather than linear progression. Old theories are accepted (in their day) on the basis of evidence, then replaced by new theories on the basis of new evidence which, in conjunction with the old evidence, provides a better overall explanation. But this "progress" may swing back to the old theory in the face of still newer evidence. I considered the "light" example a case in point: first particle-theory, then wave-theory, now something with properties of both. Whether one considers this progress linear, cyclic, pendular, or whatever, is largely subjective; my point was merely that old ideas can make a comeback, much as old styles of clothing do, albeit with modern enhancements. Mill's observation, that the whole truth rarely (if ever) rests with one idea or the other when two conflict, should be expected to produce this kind of outcome.

Where I set up the first straw-man against Feyerabend, my lecturer asks, "what about the realist argument that such 'Progress' (whether good or bad) is best explained by the assumption that science gets at the truth?" I can grant the assumption that there is a correlation between "finding truth" and "making progress" — I may even grant that the two have a causal relationship — but it is presumptuous to think that the whole truth has been discovered, or even that there is no better method for finding the same truth, or other aspects of the same truth as yet undiscovered. This is why we can always hope for further improvements in science and the philosophy thereof. Scientific realism prescribes nothing in regard to the scientific method — it merely acts as a post-fact explanation in the event of success — so a scientific realist cannot (on the basis of scientific realism alone) reasonably disagree with Feyerabend's claim that there is no special scientific method.

Perhaps the scientific realist would have us accept that this connection with the truth, which, if imperfect, is nonetheless the best we have (or so Richard Dawkins and others tell us), and thus worthy of special status. Feyerabend answers this directly, himself.

"Truth" is such a nicely neutral word. Nobody would deny that it is commendable to speak the truth and wicked to tell lies. Nobody would deny that — and yet nobody knows what such an attitude amounts to. So it is easy to twist matters and to change allegiance to truth in one's everyday affairs into allegiance to the Truth of an ideology which is nothing but the dogmatic defense of that ideology. And it is of course not true that we have to follow the truth. Human life is guided by many ideas. Truth is one of them. Freedom and mental independence are others. If Truth, as conceived by some ideologists, conflicts with freedom, then we have a choice. We may abandon freedom. But we may also abandon Truth. (Alternatively, we may adopt a more sophisticated idea of truth that no longer contradicts freedom; that was Hegel's solution.) My criticism of modern science is that it inhibits freedom of thought. If the reason is that it has found the truth and now follows it, then I would say that there are better things than first finding, and then following such a monster.

— Paul Feyerabend, How to Defend Society Against Science

For my own part, I would point out that scientific truths are always uncertain and incomplete. Many important questions cannot be answered scientifically, such as those which pertain to how things ought to be. Science can only tell us about what is, and the consequences of certain actions (subject to limitations), but never what we ought to do. Good science is important in aiding our decisions on how to act, but we must make value judgments in choosing which outcome we aim for. Value judgments always transcend the bounds of science, but any claim that science ought to reign supreme must itself be based on such a value judgment. Thus, Science lacks the power to anoint itself King.

At the point where I ponder upon the low status of "memes" in Darwinist circles, my lecturer suggests that they are often depicted as nasty parasites because the survival of the meme may be due to non-rational advantages. No doubt this is true, but I see it as self-defeating. Our convictions with regards to the goodness of rationality are based in the same meme-prone brains which here disparage non-rational memes. How can we be sure that reason itself is not just a meme? Dawkins seems to think that our faculty of reason, with refinement, may allow us to defeat parasitic memes, but won't this merely mean the triumph of the "rationality meme"? So far as I can tell, the whole idea of a "parasitic meme" is just an elaborate way for Dawkins to express his personal preference for scientific rationalism; a meme which only avoids the pejorative "parasitic" on account of his preference for it.

This could lead to an argument about the status of reason, and I don't particularly want to embark on such an epic here. My personal feeling — and I suspect that Feyerabend would have been sympathetic to this view — is that reason ought not to be allowed to become a tyrant, presuming ultimate authority over every area of thought. As with science, it is an invaluable guide to knowing consequences, but limited in other areas. It can apply value judgments, but not make them. And, as Feyerabend said of truth, we may choose to follow other ideas; to act irrationally as a matter of conscience, or love, for example. When reason dictates one thing, and conscience dictates another, which is it right to follow?

Where I suggest that competitive forces between opposing views might weed out weak arguments, my lecturer asks how this might happen in Feyerabend's scheme. If the various teams are to compete in a round robin, then we must surely require some "rules of the game" — some shared "objective" standards — by which to judge them. To this, I must respond firmly in the negative. If we buy into Feyerabend's radical program, then we unavoidably embrace a degree of subjectivism. Weak arguments are not weeded out by the objective application of the rules of the game, but subjectively by the participants. Participants will have differing and ever-shifting evaluations of the other particpants' theories in light of new developments, including adjustments of their own critical values. Broad consensus may be reached on some points, and not others. But in terms of weeding out weaknesses in one's own arguments (a matter which is rather important in a subjectivist model), one is better served by arguing with an intelligent but disagreeable party than a purely agreeable one.

Note that I say "subjectivism" rather than "relativism". I have no difficulty in embracing a universal and absolute reality (as an abstract truth) whilst at the same time affirming that we are under-equipped to know this reality with any certainty. I can embrace the idea that models of this reality which most closely mirror it will be more productive, which is to say that I can embrace a kind of scientific realism, whilst at the same time claiming that this grasp of reality is loose and clumsy enough that we ought not to presume any authoritative knowledge of the reality itself. As Feyerabend says, "theories cannot be justified and their excellence cannot be shown without reference to other theories." Reality itself may be an absolute, but we are limited to arguing the relative merits of theories, and those on the basis of equally arguable metrics.

The demand for universal "objective" standards is precisely what gives science its tyrannical aspect, and is precisely what Feyerabend requires us to relinquish. It is natural to suppose, given the premise of a universally shared reality, that we ought to have a universally shared method for determining truths about it. But that supposition is flawed, because we require direct access to reality in order to know how well our methods work, and there would be no need for the method in the first place if such access were available. One might suppose that progress towards better methods will follow a linear path, but that assumes the underlying problem is of a simple, linear nature, which it is not. Rather, every method is a complex mix of truth and error; of strength and weakness.

With these things in mind, I conclude (again) that Feyerabend and Mill have a point. Our confidence in our "best" theories and arguments is misplaced when they achieve their "best" status primarily by insisting that they be judged on their own terms. We are deluded if we think our judgments are not value-laden when we only permit one set of values, such as the supremacy of rationality. But if we accept that our views on what is real must, ultimately, be subjective (even though reality itself is not), and surrender the demand for universal standards in favour of freedom and diversity, then the resulting ferment of ideas could prove productive for all participants.